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MILITARY FORMATIONS AND SOCIAL FORMATIONS:
A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS

by

Johan Galtung

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Johan Galtung
Chair in Conflict and Peace Research, University of Oslo,
Institut Universitaire d'Études du Développement, Genève

1. Introduction.

With the total world budget for the military systems
rapidly approaching $ 300 billion, in other words about $ 75
per capita, for each inhabitant in the world, each present
member of the human race,[1] there is no doubt that the military
formation is a major part of the contemporary human society.
At the same time there are about half hundred regimes that can
be characterized as military, and a number in addition that,
although not military in the formal sense of having come into
being through a military coup, are relying on military support
to the extent that the civilian government sometimes can be
referred to as a front. If a young boy in most developing
countries asks the question "how do I make career in this society",
the honest answer would probably be "join the military, it can
lead you anywhere". In fact, the present growth rate of the
military system is much higher in the Third World than in the
First and Second worlds, a factor which will be discussed later
on in the article.

The ultimate purpose of the military system is destruction,
destruction of human lives, the man-made environment and the
environment in general. Deterrence is based on the probability
that the system is both motivated and capable of destruction,
in the first run of the military system on the other side, ulti-
mately - as mentioned - of anything.[2] The Indo-China wars have
given the most frightening examples of what the human mind,
combined with military organization, is able to concoct in terms
of destructiveness. Given this the military system can be said
to be a strange part of human society indeed, both in the sense
of being "funny" and in the sense of being "alien". It drains
resources, and has once in a while to prove its destructiveness
in order to remain credible. The idea of controlling its growth
so as to arrive at a constant size; the idea of trimming this
size downwards, and the ultimate idea of eliminating the military

system completely are, as ideas, logical consequences of the
nature and expansion of the military system. As ideas they
are old and have a relatively high standing in this century,
as practice the present situation bears ample testimony to the
fact that they have not been very effective. There must be some
reasons for that, and the present article is concerned with some
of those reasons. What maintains military systems, what are
they here for?

2. Four ways of thinking about military systems.

To give some answers to this question let us start by
making two distinctions.

One may choose to analyze military systems, both their
soft-ware (manpower) and hard-ware (arms) components sui generis
as if they were isolated systems, detached from the social
environment. Military systems sometimes invite this type of
analysis: they command a separate Ministry with a separate budget;
the soft-ware is kept in separate quarters, often far away from
other people; and the hard-ware - both production and storage -
is kept well hidden, in places not even known to most participants
in the military system themselves. In some countries the military
system in fact constitutes its own separate society with its own
production facilities, its own distribution machinery, producing
and distributing not only for the military system as such, but
everything else that is needed for the reproduction of the system;
food, clothes, housing, medical service, schooling etc. It is
in fact a society inside society; to focus on it sui generis
would appear highly warranted.[3)]

But this type of approach neglects at least two very
important factors. First, the military system is ultimately
intended to be used, and to be used in a conflict. But a conflict
can be analysed as a conflict-formation, consisting of parties
and a conflict issue. To analyze the military system without
taking this into account would be a little bit like analyzing
a hospital without any reference to patients or to diseases,
or analyzing a school system without any reference to pupils.

One may learn something, but the analysis will tend to remain
very abstract, detached from social reality. Distinctions,
taxonomies may be made between military systems mainly operating
on land (armies), at sea (navies) and in the air (air forces)
as was done in the old days, and between military forces intended
for mega-war (nuclear capabilities, weather modification, arti-
ficially triggered tsunamis or earthquakes, etc. not to mention
large-scale bacteriological and chemical warfare); macro-war
(such as most of the systems used within the First and Second
World Wars) and micro-war (guerrilla, "terrorism", etc.) - or
super-conventional, conventional and sub-conventional systems as
would be a more suitable classification today. Such taxonomies
are useful, but only in so far as they can be related to a
structural analysis, using conflict-formations as a basic ana-
lytical tool.

The second aspect left out is how the military system
relates to the social structure in which it is embedded, the
society producing and reproducing the system. The relation of
interdependence whereby the society forms the military system
and vice versa will become more pronounced, the stronger, more
"developed" the military system is - and since the concern with
military systems today to a large extent is a concern with their
growth, there should be an increasing reason to pay particular
attention to this interdependency.

Implicit in what has been said above is a second major
distinction in analyzing military systems: the inter-system
approach vs. the intra-system approach. Usually "system" stands
for society in the sense of a polity, meaning for all practical
purposes a "country" - sometimes organized as a nation-state.
Just as one gets different perspectives on, for instance, dis-
armament or demilitarization processes depending on whether one
focuses on the military system sui generis or on the general
structure, different types of light is shed on the problem depending
on whether one looks at relations between systems or what happens
inside them.

Taken together this gives rise to a fourfold-table, given here as Table 1:

Table 1.   Four approaches in analysing military systems.

	Inter-system approach	Intra-system approach
Military system sui generis	(1) actio - reactio analysis	(2) Eigendynamik analysis
Structural context	(3) conflict formation analysis	(4) structural compatibility analysis

Let us now try to spell out typical perspectives arising from this map of analytical orientations, following the numbers and the arrows since this is more or less, by and large, the way analysis has proceeded, and one might add progressed, in recent years. [4]

(1) The actio-reactio model. This approach looks outdated today, not because it will not give very adequate insights in many situations, but because it leads to high levels of mystification when taken too seriously. L.F. Richardson[5] did a service by putting the model on mathematical form because its crudeness became more evident. A differential equation presenting the level of armament in either country as a function of the increment of the armament in the other country is a very good baseline model, not so much because of what it says as because of the many things it obviously does not say. It portrays the military system as essentially other-directed, propelled by what happens in other military systems, not by its own dynamics, neither by the structure or structures in which it is embedded. It does not help to equip the differential equations with some parameters or constants as long as these are not tied explicitly to other variables; if they were, the insufficiency of this perspective would be brought out more clearly since these variables would have to be fetched from one or more of the other three cells in Table 1 (or from other sources). Parameters become ways of escaping theoretical exploration by focussing on curve-fitting instead.

(2) The Eigendynamik or autistic model.

In this model the growth of the military system is
seen as propelled by internal forces, and the focus is usually
on the hard-ware component and how it is produced, and the model
is essentially economistic. In order to produce military hard-
ware, the same economic factors are needed as for the production
of any hardware: raw materials, capital, labor, research and
organization (in the sense of administrators, i.e. a mixture of
managers and bureaucrats where the ratio of the mix will vary
from system to system). This, in and by itself, does not reveal
any built-in expansionism, except in the usual sense that when
there is an imbalance in the supply of factors for the production
of anything, the tendency may be to fill up on the lagging factor(s)
and not to cut down on those that are in excess.[6] Thus, if the
raw materials are there, so is the labor, and researchers have
done their work so that the model of what to produce exists and
the whole adminisrative machinery is present, there will be a
tendency to try to provide the missing capital rather than to
send the raw materials back, dismiss the workers, let the research
findings be shelved unused and transfer the administrators to
something else. In fact, this is probably particularly true if
the people involved can prove convincingly that the lag is in
one factor only, making it look very uneconomical not to fill up
on that one.[7]

However, there would be stronger factors in the internal
dynamics causing expansion. First, there is the very simple
circumstance that the military system is commanded by military
people who, like most others in a modern society, would like to
have an expanding share of the total social product because their
power and prestige would be related to the relative size inside
the society, and it is in that society that power and prestige
is measured, not when pitted against the enemy at war - which,
after all, are exceptional periods in human and social history.
In order to justify their claim, they would use model (1) reasoning,
or the type of reasoning just presented, at least keeping share
constant.[8]

How successful they would be depends on how successfully
they are controlled by other sectors of society. If this control

is relatively strong, expansionism will have to be obtained
through other channels, and the most effective channel from
the military point of view would be to have the "civilian"
sector want an expansion of the military sector because of what
it can do to the civilian sector. At this point the reasoning
shades over into model (4) below: It becomes a question of what
the military system does to the surrounding society.

It also belongs here, however, because the reasoning
remains so close to what has already been presented: it is
essentially production-oriented, and economistic. In the production
very concrete human beings enter: workers, researchers, capitalists
and bureaucrats. An expansion of the military system where pro-
duction of hardware is concerned may also be an expansion of
their power and prestige, and for that reason as desirable as
it might look from the point of view of the military people
themselves. The rest is a question of how well coordinated these
expansionist interests are, which may be a question of the same
person appearing in multiple roles or having relatives and friends
in other parts of the total system. The harmony of interest in
expansion, measured in power and prestige for the military man
(and the military researchers) and the military bureaucrats,
in these terms and in addition in terms of profit for the capitalist
is what is usually referred to as MIC (military-industrial complex)
or MBC (military-bureaucratic complex), for the market and
centrally planned economies respectively. In doing so a much
too clear line is drawn between the two types of economies,
It might be much more fruitful to talk about MCBRC - the military-
capitalist-bureaucrat-researcher complex, since it seems to be
the type of alliance that is at work, meaning by "capitalist"
also the top administrators of centrally planned economic organi-
zations ("state capitalists").

However, the military production system can also do much
more to the surrounding society, and this is where the analysis
shades over into model (4) below. It is capable of putting to use
excess capital (which might produce inflation) or excess labor
(meaning unemployed people, and this would also include unemployed
researchers, bureaucrats and capitalists in times of real distress).

thereby serving a keynesian function in the economy.9)Remarkable
in this connection is the absorbtion capacity of the military
machinery: it is at the same time capital intensive and labor
intensive; it can absorb any amount of capital into its hardware
components and any amount of labor of any kind into its software.
There has to be a motivation, however, in order to accept the
military as the recipient of all these economic factors - and this
is, of course, where the politics of tension-management enters.
The thesis that there should be some kind of proportionality between
rate of increase in military capacity and tension level seems
reasonable, but is hardly an unconditional one. Thus, a suffici-
ently autocratic regime might simply increase its military capacity
regardless of what the tension level is for the reasons mentioned
under "intra-system approach" in Table 1. However, if a tension
image can be produced, it probably will be produced, for no other
reasons because of the mores surrounding the military machinery:
there is an assumption that it should be relevant for conflict in
and inter-system setting.

     If there should happen to be two systems - two countries,
blocs,alliances etc. - tied to each other with a credible conflict,
but with the same internal economic problems, then they might both
make use of this approach to stabilize their economies. It should
be pointed out that this can hardly be successfully analyzed in
terms of a quest for profit or power: it should rather be seen
as parallel quests for equilibria in the economic systems. If at
the same time there is a tension between them it will look to the
outside as if the actio-reactio model is at work, each system being
inspired in its military build-up by what it observes in the other
system. In reality, however, the notion of two parallel autistic
developments might be more fruitful in understanding what is
happening. 10)And at this point one should not be confused by the use
of "incidents" as a part of the tension-management process.
A sub-marine in the coastal waters of one and an infraction of the
air-space of the other might be used by either country as justifi-
cation of its military build-up, But one should not disregard the
obvious hypothesis that there could be a Gentlemens'-Agreement
according to which one incident is traded off for the other, serving
the joint interest of the same type of people in both countries in

increasing their share of the total economy.

Critical points to look for in justifying this kind of
analysis would not be so much to what extent the civilian and
military sectors are intertwined. More important would be the
extent to which the military sector is a mirror image of the
civilian sector even when kept totally segregated from the latter.
If the military sector absorbs economic factors in roughly speaking
the same proportions as the civilian sector, then it can obviously
be used as a parallel society, having a considerable cushioning
effect. It is the homology rather than the lack of clear borders
between the two that is important here, but the two factors
together would of course contribute even further to the use of
the military sector for the purposes mentioned.

In all of this the profit motive and the power motives
stand out as important forces in their own right particularly if
the military factor can promise quicker returns in either or both
than the civilian sector. The speed factor in connection with
military production, the need for quick utilization of money and
power will probably be .associated with higher returns, if for no
other reasons because of less elaborate control mechanisms when
everything has to happen so quickly. Quick action will have to
be rewarded. But the point made above is that analyses in terms
of profit motives of either kind are insufficient: the type of
equilibration upwards in order to produce an administratively
neat structure, and the use of the military as a parallel society,
giving momentum to the civilian factor in low energy periods can
just as well be carried out by bureaucrats employed at a fixed
salary.

(3) The conflict formation model. In this model, rational and
in a sense conventional, the military formation is related to the
conflict formation. The military system is seen as a response to
conflict, in some cases also as triggering or engendering conflict.
The question, then, becomes what conflict and how to analyze it -
and here the notion of a conflict formation as something consisting
of an "issue" and parties, with motivation and capabilities -
the capabilities to a large extent coinciding with the military
system - enters.

By and large three kinds of major conflict formations
can be distinguished at the international level: conflicts between
two center countries (the C-C formation), particularly the super-
power conflict; conflicts between two periphery countries (the P-P
formation), like in the Middle East; and the center-periphery
conflict (the C-P formation), which is by far the most ubiquitious
and important type of conflict in the post-Second World War world.

If we now assume that the C-C formation easily might lead
to a mega-war and the P-P formation to a macro-war, the question
remains: what about the C-P formation? The safest answer would
probably be to say it could lead to all kinds of war, mega, macro
and micro. This, however, will depend on how the conflict formation
turns out on more closer scrutiny, and there are at least three
possible formations: [11]

(1)   The national war of liberation: the center country
      against the periphery country;

(2)   The peoples' war of liberation: the people in the
      periphery against the whole center country joined
      by its bridgehead in the periphery;

(3)   The marxian formation: the people in periphery and
      center against the elites in periphery and center.

One might now speculate that for the first of these configurations
the macro-war would be most appropriate, for the second the micro-
war as it will almost have to be a guerilla war with "insurgency"
and "counter-insurgency", and for the third a sort of parallel micro-
war in both theaters. The third is less likely given the general
disharmony of interest between the periphery in the center and
the periphery in the periphery, as witnessed by the general tendency
of the working classes in the center countries to fight against,
not with the people in the periphery in the typical C-P wars of
the last generation![12] Another factor making the marxian formation
unlikely is the social distance, both in terms of level of living
and in racial/ethnic/civilizational terms.

The problem that comes out of this kind of perspective is
the relationship between the conflict formations and the military
races. The race that has captured the public eye, the strategic
arms race particularly in the field of nuclear arms, seems to be
geared to a C-C conflict, whereas the most frequent wars are found
in the two C-P patterns[13] This would, and should, give rise to the

smoke-screen hypothesis: that an arms race may not necessarily
stand in any evident and direct relation to underlying conflict
formations. Thus, it may very well be that to both super-powers
the most important, indeed so important as to be a matter of
life and death, conflict formation is the C-P formation: the
United States with the Third World and the Soviet Union with
China. It may also be that as conflict formations these are less
legitimate than the East-West conflict, and that this constitutes
a reason for using the East-West conflict formation as a basis
for legitimizing expansion of the military formations, while
at the same time gearing the real attention towards the C-P or
Nort-South formations. Thus, there are good reasons to say that
the East-West formation is somewhat without an issue: to the
extent that the issue was "who shall rule over Eastern Europe"
it was probably solved through a complex bargaining technique,
a type of horse-trading whereby the Soviet Union is given political-
military ascendancy on the condition that the West is permitted
to penetrate economically and culturally - through joint ventures
and free flow of information, partially also of persons. Needless
to say, all of these four aspects were to some extent sanctified
through the Final Act of Helsinki 1975. The losers in this deal
were the Eastern European peoples,becoming a double periphery,not having a
say in the conflict "resolution" process either, nor was that the
intention.   The point is that as an issue separating East and
West it has to some extent evaporated except for details in the
bargaining process and the compromises attained.

Not so with the North-South conflicts. Both the First World/
Third World conflict configuration and the complex web of Soviet
Union/China conflicts[14] are more than real enough, in ways it is
unnecessary to spell out in any detail here. It is the conclusion
that matters: that the conflict issues seem increasingly to be
located in the North-South context whereas the conflict capabilities
are - presumably - located in the East-West formation. And that
would be at the roots of the mystification or smoke-screen hypo-
thesis: it is a giant, although only partly intended, machinery
making people believe that the real problem is to control, even
limit the capabilities in the East-West conflict, whereas the basic

problem rather seems to be how to resolve North-South conflicts.
Of course the two are related: there is the considerable danger
that so called North-South conflicts may have a spill-over in the
East-West configuration and trigger off the latent conflict
formation from the Cold War, although not so likely in the European
theater as other parts of the world.[15]

It is evident that the strategic arms limitation talks
(SALT) have not lead to the limitation of strategic arms; although
they may have lead to some limitation of the rate of increase in
strategic arms. What, then, have they lead to? One tempting
hypothesis, and a part of the general smoke-screen theory, would
be that the talks are actually about the limitation of strategic
arms targets. Thus, is it really reasonable to believe that the
super-powers are so stupid as to agree with each other that they
are each other's targets of the horrible destructive capability
they have developed? Would it not be more reasonable to believe
that they could both agree to a bargain of the "in case of a war
I shall use your satellite as a target on the condition that you
use mine - on a quid pro quo basis-and we stay off each other".[16]
It has of course also been argued that the P-P formation is exactly
this: vicarious warfare between the two central powers, at least
serving as a testing ground for their weaponry, be that in Indo-
China or in the Middle East,or elsewhere. But there is also a
European dimension to it that should eventually make the satellites
(allies in more polite language) of the super-powers in the NATO
and WTO systems understand their common interest, seeking contacts,
ultimately either withdrawing from the alliances and joining
the non-aligned countries, or even ganging against the super-powers.
That may still be for the future, but perhaps not for the distant
future.[17]

(4) The structural compatibility model.[18] According to this model,
which is also an intra-system model, the basic point would be the
general structural relation between the military formation and the
social formation. In order to explore this we need a minimum
typology of social structures, and one such taxonomy in four
types, using the two dicotomies vertical/horizontal and collectivist/
individualist would be as follows:

Table 2.   Four studies for social and military analysis.

	Collectivist	Individualist
Vertical	Model I : Conservative	Model II: Liberal
Horizontal	Model III: Communal	Model IV: ?

Examples: for model I Medieval, feudal societies, for model II
"Modern" liberal, corporate societies, for model III the People's
Communes in China - and model IV we leave empty in this connection
- it may be some type of future configuration at the same time
horizontal and diverse.[19]

The important point now would be the idea that military
systems can also be categorized in accordance with this type of
general taxonomy of social systems. Thus, the model I system
would obviously be a very tightly spun army, very much centered
around the general, the caudillo or cacique - the leader who would
embody the army, an army which would essentially belong to him
and move with him wherever he went. There would not be so much
individual mobility between the various rank levels. Most people
would be born into their levels in the army, and the loyalty and
general spirit of servitude would be rather complete. To leave
it would be worse than treason, it would be spiritual death.

And then there is the modern army, the model II army:
rational, based on individual mobility, on military competence
and promotion into the upper ranks. Similarly there is the model III
army: small units, very horizontal, very little difference between
the ranks, strongly collectivist - in other words, the guerilla unit.
And then there is the fourth possibility: the combination of
horizontallity with a diverse, even individualist orientation.
One way of interpreting this would be to say that the single unit

of defence is horizontally organized, which means that it has to
be relatively small. But there is also diversity, meaning that
there are several types of approaches, different ways of doing
defence, in other words of ensuring security. Most important in
this connection would be the combination of the guerilla approach
with non-military defence.[20] Structurally they have some similarities
as they both have to be organized in a horizontal manner, but
functionally they are rather diverse and it might be discussed
(and is indeed discussed) to what extent they are combinable.[21]
The answer to that will probably be the social context: if the
context is sufficiently diverse, diversity in matters of defence
will emerge.

Thus, the point of departure for this type of analysis would
be the idea that one the one hand there are four types of social
formations, and on the other hand four types of military formations.-
the question being, how do they relate to each other? Of course,
the general answer would be that one is a mirror of the other, and
since the military system in general is embedded in the social
system, the military will be a reflection of society in general.
"Tell me what society you have, and I shall tell you what type of
military system you have" would be the basic guiding rule. The
military would be a society within the society, some kind of
crystallized version, of course deviating in details but to a large
extent reflecting the basic properties of the macro structure.
More particularly, in "modern", "developed", vertical/individualist
society the military formation will be of the same kind, albeit
with some Model I characteristics also present. The officer-in-
charge will still have a tendency to talk about "my boys", there
will still be paternalistic rather than managerial behavior patterns,
but the general inclination will be towards objective, cool and
universalistic , sachlich , interaction.

This particular case is important because Model II society
is the predominant model of development in the world today. It is
considered a crowning achievement by the "developed" societies -
rich, capitalist, (private or state) western societies - and it
is considered the model to be imitated by most Third world countries,
whether they go in for the liberal Western European/North American

variety, or the more autocratic Eastern European/Soviet variety.

And this leads us to the _inertia hypothesis_. The point
is simply this: the military performs a function within the
development dynamic of the society, and as long as no functional
equivalent has been found that can perform that function more or
less equally well, _and/or_ another development model has been
accepted, the military system becomes close to indispensable to
the society as a whole, from the point of view of the ruling
elites. More particularly, in the developed countries where
development is seen as a problem. of adjustment of details, and
above all as stabilization, as status quo maintenance, the military
has exactly that function. It is a reserve society that can be
set in in times of crisis, guaranteeing the maintenacne of the
basic pattern. Thus, if governments do not perform, a military
coup can be launched and the top military will serve as a reserve
government to be substituted for the civilian one in times of
crisis. And correspondingly, if for instance workers should be
able to launch a real general strike, the bottom part of the
military formation, the soldiers can be put in their place, sent
down to the mines, work in the docks, etc.[22] In real deep crisis
both process.es may take place at the same time, at least for some
period - the military will, in fact, act as an occupying army.
But for this to happen while at the same time maintaining key
features of the system, the military formation has to be a model II
formation, both for the military people to fit into the holes in
the ordinary social structure, made empty by their political moves;
and for those interacting with the new status -holders to feel
that they are nevertheless within a familiar context. A guerilla
army would not be able to keep the economies of certain capitalist
ruling elites going the way those elites want it to be run, nor would
a very classical, mediaeval feudal army. What is needed is exactly
the army they have, and officers who know how to respond when
they are "called upon"; officers who .. know something about
political timing., when to come to the rescue of the country, i.e.
the class.[23]

In the "developing" countries the picture looks different.
Here it is not a question of status quo maintenance, but of pushing
what is usually an exceedingly complex social formation with strong
model I features into "The Twentieth Century", meaning a model II

structure with corresponding social ethos. A "modern" model II
army can constitute a training ground for living in model II society,
whether at the level of the private or the level of the commanding
offices. Individual detachability, mobility away from each other,
upwards and sidewards, are much less known in other social forma-
tions; they can be close to the rule in a modern army. In the
classical army a division would move with the general and vice versa;
in a modern army a general can be detached from " my boys", and
put on head of another division - meaning that neither the former,
nor the latter were really "his boys". [24]

Further, a modern army gives a training in discipline -
in this, of course, it does not necessarily differ from any other
military formation. The general problem that so many developing
countries think they are facing, like the Soviet leaders in the
early years of the young Soviet Republic, speculating how at all it
could be possible to make out of the Russian muzhik, usually
considered lazy, dirty, unshaven and uncouth, often drunk, an
industrial worker capable of appearing on time, performing boring,
routine operations without protesting but with exactitude, with
a sense of detail and responsibility, leaving on time and reappearing
next morning. One answer was: put them in the army, discipline
them there, and send them out again. And what applies at the level
of the lower ranks also applies higher up, only that those people
- the officers - could also be seen as potential management in any
kind of firm.

A third function contributed by the military is to instill
into its people a certain ethos, a generally speaking western ethos,
that seems to be about the same in military structures and in
capitalist corporations, private or state. In both there is the
same idea of a center ("headquarter"is the term used in both cases)
and periphery units that operate according to blueprints and
standard operating precedures devised in the center. In both there
is a keen sense of drama, of crisis: a way of nursing the time-
dimension so that crises can occur and recur, providing enough
tension and motivation to keep people always on the move, never
relaxing, never feeling that any final solution has been attained
(thus, impending defeat and impending bankruptcy have relatively
similar structures).[25] Further, in both there is the same simplistic

devotion to a low number of key variables, dimensions along which
the game is being fought:[26] investment, input/output ratios in
one case; launching of hardware/software and a comparison on losses
and gains on either side, eg. in terms of casualties vs. territory
and other forms of value conquered, in the second case. The simple
tool of cost-benefit analysis along a couple of quantifiable
dimensions would provide the necessary information to know whether
one is winning or losing. Still further: there is the man over man
syndrome,competitive individualism in both. And, there is,indeed,
the man over nature idea: capitalist use of nature with highly
insufficient regard for ecological imbalances created is only
exceeded by the military approach to nature;total and instant ecocide.

Thus, capitalist construction and military destruction
are sufficiently isomorphic to let one of them serve as a training
ground for the other. Consequently, small wonder that a typical
career pattern in developing countries today would be a relative
quick ascent through the military structure, and after that
horizontal mobility into a position of management in a private or
state corporation. And correspondingly for the soldiers: more or
less voluntarily the position as a soldier may be an intervening
step from an essentially tribal existence to that of the "modern"
industrial worker. In this case the inertia wheel is not used
as a braking force, but as major energizing factor, providing
sufficient amount of social energy for a transition from a model I
to a model II social formation. Those who deplore this function
should ask themselves: which other social institution could provide
a corresponding training ground, both in the structure and in the
ethos of modern II society - given that this is the model ? [27]

In today's "socialist"countries it is probably correct
to say that the military system has both functions at the same
time, both that of stabilizing the society through autocratic
control, and that of providing this type of training ground.
In the capitalist developed societies the latter function is not
so important: all of society is already changed in that direction;
schools to a large extent even family relations, associations
and what not - for that reason future managers in those societies
are given more technical training, for instance the kind of training
acquired in commercial colleges, schools of administration (such
as in France, but even in the ENA system living and working in

structures with a certain ethos are usually considered a better training than anything that can be learned in the traditional university manner). The military system is less necessary.

All of this, incidentally, may also serve to shed a different type of light on the military coup. It may not be so much a phenomenon to be analysed along the democratic vs. dictatorial political system type of dimension as a question of having in society an institution that at least potentially throws its net widely into all corners of society looking for talent that can then be sifted upwards and towards the center through a system of mobilization and mobility, a detection machinery to discover sufficient display of talent to warrant promotion, with the added thought that only part of those discovered will remain in the military, others will proceed to other sectors of society. A shorter or longer period as a high ranking officer may serve to legitimize the young peasant's son who otherwise will have no chance of making any headway in society; education being much too time-requiring, and much too uncertain.

3. Some implications for the theory of disarmament.

These, then, are four approaches or four ways of thinking about the military systems. What would be the four corresponding ways of thinking about disarmament? We then conceive of "disarmament" in a very simple manner: it is a question of reducing, unilaterally, bilaterally, multilaterally, the destructive capacity of the military systems; both soft-ware and hard-ware components.[28]

According to the actio-reactio paradigm the theory is relatively simple: inverse the armament spiral. If a positive arms increment in one party can lead to a positive increment in the other party, then a negative increment, a decrement, could/might lead to a decrement on the other side. Instead of a 5% increase per year, a 5% decrease. The optimist would feel that this could even work unilaterally: if one party announces its intention to set aside x % of the sums devoted to the military, annually, for, for instance the cause of "development," then there will be some kind of contagion effect leading others on to the same narrow path. At this point it should be added that whether or not this holds empirically is one question, another question is whether it would be good for development. Many might feel that development is not so much a question of more capital, but more a question of self-reliance and social structures that promote human and social development - hardly things to be bought for money; money may even stand in the way.[29]

As an approach to disarmament this looks naïve, not so much for the reason usually given, viz. that people are not that idealistic, that some governments will cheat, or may even make use of the situation to improve their own relative military standing. Although all this may be true as an analytical approach, it is not the point we have in mind.[30] It disregards the question of whether governments in general and military decision-makers in particular are really that free to act; whether they really can disarm following signals from others even when they want to. The three other paradigms will inform us that they are not free: there are strong forces in the productive systems attached to the military formation, there is the whole problem of conflict formation between the two parties

with possible smoke-screen games that may have going on for some
time, and there is the question of the structural contribution
of the military to the society. To disarm even by a small percentage
may seriously upset all these more or less finally tuned and
equilibrated mechanisms.

The second paradigm, the Eigendynamik idea, would then
take this as a point of departure and say that we have to change
society first. One idea might be to remove the profit factor,
for instance by putting arms manufacturers on a fixed salary.
The idea has been tried and found very much wanting: the biggest
arms dealers in the world today and manufacturers, are by far the
national governments - and in general (with the exception of some
corruption in the form of greasing money) the management of these
corporations is on a fixed salary. But they are closely linked
to people concerned with trade balance, with the economic growth
of the country, with how to secure permament and full employment;
and instead of getting the reward in the form of profit they might
like to contribute to such goals, and those who have less lofty,
more individualistic goals might be quite satisfied with power-
profit rather than money-profit. One might then speculate that
they could possibly also have their power position frozen, and in
general be put in such a situation that there will be nothing
personal to gain at all from an increase in military destructive
capacity. Such systems could be imagined (see under the fourth
paradigm below), but they might still not solve the problem ,because
the collective interest in what could accrue to the country as a whole
as a result of an increase in hardware and/or software might provide
sufficient motivation.

An economy less prone to crisis, less in need of a military
(or some other) sector that could be used as a keynesian, counter-
cyclical mechanism might be useful; and such economies might be
emerging.[31] It is, however, quite clear that this brings us much
deeper into social analysis than the path that has so far been
followed in this century, nationalization of private arms industry
and arms trade.

The third paradigm, the conflict formations paradigm with
the smoke-screen hypothesis, leads us to one insight simple to

formulate but rather difficult to practice: if you want to disarm, you had better find out what the conflict is about. It may not be the conflict the parties say they share, it may be some other conflict - one indicator would be to what extent the military level is related to the level of tension in one or the other conflict formation.[32] When/if the conflict formation has been found, the next approach is to try to do something about the conflict; leading to conflict resolution, or even to conflict solution.

This is not the place to enter into any detail as to conflict negation theory. Suffice it only to say that conflict negation may not necessarily result in disarmament, and not necessarily only because there is another, hidden conflict, under the apparent conflict. The conflict machinery has a considerable inertia, not easily dismantled even when its rationale has presumably been removed. What happens, however, may be that the conflict machinery is no longer so firmly targeted on the other party. It is more held as a potential, as a general capacity. Thus, dis-targeting rather than disarmament may be a more modest, but also in a sense more realistic goal, containing the most important component of what disarmament is supposed to be about.[33] After some time disarmament may then follow, or at least heavily reduced armament.

The fourth paradigm, the structural compatibility paradigm, leads us to much more complex types of disramament thinking. A first idea might be to look for other institutions that might function like the military as a model II social formation. One suggestion has been the police: it is structurally not too diffe-rent from the military, and if sufficiently big could serve the same function.[34] However, like the military, it may have extremely important negative and destructive effects, as when police is used as a major tool for internal surveillance including as the source of recruitment for the people staffing the chambers of torture.

A more innocuous form would be the fire brigade; when run as a voluntary association (like in the United States in the old days, and in many other countries) it no doubt has had a function of that type. Still another would be the peace corps, international or national, civilian service organizations, and so on -

in general the famous William James "moral equivalent of war".
The Gandhian shanti se a is a typical example in mind.

A more radical approach would be to question the use
of the model II social formation as a development model. A model III
formation in the military sector would by necessity consist of
smaller units, and the experience so far, at least, is that they
are used for defence rather than for attack. The whole modus operandi
of guerilla forces presupposes a home base, the famous fish in the
water, and does not seem compatible with large scale invasions abroad.
In the future this may change, but at present invations seem to be
more easily made by highly vertically organized military formations,
whether of the model I or model II varieties; hardly by guerilla
forces.[35] As a consequence: a shift in developmental model more
towards model III social formations might be accompanied by a
similar shift in military formation, and that in and by itself
might be highly relevant to disarmament problematics. After all,
it is hardly the numerous parts of the People's Liberation Army
in China attached as small units to the Peoples Communes that will
be considered a threat to neighboring societies; rather the more
conventionally constituted parts.[36] On the other hand, i instead
of the word "guerilla" the word "commando" is used, the argument
might look less convincing: a high number of small commander units
operating on the territory of a neighboring country, crossing the
borders clandestin ly at night, might not be a pleasant perspective
to contemplate.

What about the fourth model, the idea of a pluralistic
social formation, spilling over into the military system as plural
forms of defence? It is probably in this direction that more
definite answers to the problem of reducing military destructiveness
is located, and this is certainly also the most difficult path to go.
A non-military defence unit as usually considered is small and
horizontal, like the guerilla, but in this case it is really hard
to construe out of that idea a possible aggressive threat. It would
be much too easy even for a small conventional force to repel
an international peace brigade that tries to cross the frontiers;
their modus operandi is on home territory. Moreover, it consists
mainly of software, human beings and social structure, and hardly
of any hardware at all. Its way of operating is closely linked to
the beta-structure aspect of a society,[37] to the small units rather

than to the big hierarchical structures. It is nourished by
these small units and in turn stimulates them and makes them
more able to defend themselves against encrouchment from the
outside. It does not leave the population defenseless fro
which reason a transition from military to non-military froms
of defense within a pluralistic mix i referred to as trans-
armament rather than disarmament; one reason why in the present
context it is the reduction of military destructive capacity
rather than "disarmament" that has been the goal.

4. <u>Conclusion</u>.

In conclusion, let only two things be pointed out:

(a)   no efforts to deal with the phenomena of militarization/
        demilitarization, theoretically or practically, will be
        valid within the framework of any single of the four
        analytical frameworks alone, and

(b)   what mix of the frameworks to use in a concrete case
        is very much in need of theoretical and empirical research.

NOTES

*   This paper, prepared for the Militarization/Demilitarization
subproject of the Goals,Processes and Indicators of Development
project of the UN University, was originally given as a lecture
for a Danish peace research group May 1977 in Copenhagen and
for the New Zealand Peace Society June 1977. It is reproduced
here in the original form, only with footnotes added. It should
be noted that the word "formation" is used in the title to connote
a structure in process.

1.   That the figures for 1980 would be more like $ 500 billion
      and $ 125 per capita cannot be explained away by inflation
      rates anone.

2.   The military would say the purpose is to save lives and
      guard values; but it seems fair to see institutions in
      terms of heterotelic rather than autotelic values, as the
      latter tend to be almost identical for all major institutions
      (eg. human "self-realization").

3.   Thus, in terms of satisfaction of basic needs the military
      sector is often quite self-contained. Even if it does not
      produce its own foodstuff, textiles and building material,
      it orders and distributes according to its own very special
      and uniform designs; and it usually runs its own medical
      and schooling institutions as well as transportation/communi-
      cation (logistics) sector.

4.   Obviously, for the first two catagories I am deeply indebted
      to the seminal work by Dieter Senghaas. It is felt,however,
      that his line of thinking has had a tendency to focus too
      much on the military system as detached from its structural
      context - so this may be seen as an affort to extend his
      framework for analysis.

5.   The British meteorologist who certainly was a founding father
      of quantitative peace studies in this century, as witnessed
      by his Statistics of Deadly Quarrels.

6.   Hence, the military would be expected often to present their
      claims not in terms of being behind on all dimensions, but
      in terms of profiles, where they are seriously short on one
      or a few dimensions thereby rendering inoperative the others.
      As a tactic this is, of course, the far better approach as
      it promisses substantial returns for a relatively modest input.

7. The net result is, of course, expansion. I would tend to see this as a general mechanism fostering expansionism in Western economies.

8. Often pegged to national budget, GNP or economic growth measures, meaning than in expanding economies/public sectors there will be expanding military systems totally regardless of the conflict context. It does not necessarily hold for contracting economies, however.

9. This would be demand side economics. But it probably also works as supply side economics, simply making the hardware available, putting it up for sale.

10. It should be noted that the two models do not exclude each other but rather should be seen as two components of empirical processes where the proportion between the two factors may be changing over time.

11. For more on this, see Johan Galtung, The True Worlds, Macmillan The Free Press, New York, 1980, chapters 4-6.

12. This may change, of course, if a general world recession should put the internal and external proletariats more or less on the same footing.

13. See the articles by Istvan Kende, on local wars, Journal of Peace Research, 1978.

14. With the invasion of Afghanistan 27 December 1979 it has become clear that Soviet North-South conflict in a very direct and real sense is not very different from the same conflict for the capitalist West.

15. The point is simply this: it is a question of where in the world many countries would be in the grey zone between a private or a state capitalist road of development, and/or challenging superpower supremacy if they are already enrolled in a camp. At least until Poland the Third world had by far the higher number!

16. I am indebted to an Eastern European high level diplomat who shall remain anonymous for this type of insight.

17. Indeed not: the "modernization" of nuclear arms, the TNF, was accepted by NATO 12 December 1979.

18. This part of the paper was originally given as a presentation to the World Order Models Project meeting, Ibadan, Nigeria January 1976.

19. See The True Worlds, chapter 3, for an effort to spell out this as a possible future society.

20. In the Nordic countries this type of proposal is being put forth once in a while, eg. by socialist parliamentarian Arne Kielland in Norway.

21. This dicussion of the "mix" has been carried by, among others, Bengt Höglund in Sweden.

22. The similarity between private and state capitalist countries becomes very clear at this point!

23. In the theory of why the Chilean military seemed less prone to intervene militarily, in the 1960s, the idea of detach- ability between top officers and soldiers (a model II rather than model I military) was prominent. They did feel called upon, however - when the pattern of US imperialism and bourgeois privilege was really threatened, and acted accordingly 11 September 1973.

24. Cohesiveness in the military top echelons substitutes for vertical integration between the top and the soldiers. Thus, if the three armed forces concur, the military coup becomes a question of timing.

25. Thus, there has to be a written admission of defeat, and the willingness to be placed under the administration of someone else.

26. These are essentially three of the key dimensions in cosmology analysis, also see Johan Galtung, Development,Environment and Technology, UNCTAD, Geneva,1979, chapter 1.

27. It should be noted that according to this type of thinking changing the model of development is not tantamount to demilitarization. The military may still be relevant in development, and in a positive sense, but for another devel- opment, hence with another military.

28. Of course, all components have to be included,otherwise limitation on one will only be compensated for on the other dimensions of the military system. Cutting down the number of soldiers will make the system more capital-intensive. Cutting down on research capacity may put some more basic limitation on the system, however - at least in present research oriented society.

29. No Multilateral agreement is needed to make the spiral go upward according to the actio-reactio model, possibly a good argument that it may also work the other way - in other words in favor of unilateral gradualism as an approach. But this presupposes symmetry between armament and disarmament, and they are usually regarded as asymmetric processes. There is

a need for a theoretical and empirical examination
of the relative validity of the symmetry/asymmetry
perspectives.

30. See my "Two Approaches to Disarmament", in Essays in Peace
Research, Vol. II, Copenhagen, Ejlers, 1976.

31. This would be an important argument in favor of a more
modest,self-reliant, use-oriented economic system.

32. Given this indicator it is quite clear that the objective
tension reduction in Europe from detente started in the mid-
sixties to the Helsinki agreement in 1975 was far from
reflected in decreased size of the military machineries.

33. See Johan Galtung, Co-operation in Europe, Universitets-
forlaget, Oslo, 1970.

34. Costa Rica might be an example of this.

35. Subversion is not a counter-example, it also presupposes
a local basis, local water for the fish.

36. With the current change in China's social formation the
Soviet Union may have reasons to feel more threatened as
there is also a change in the military formation.

37. See the work referred to in footnote 26 above, chapter 1.